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Abstract
The paper demonstrates that two relatively unknown features of the employment
cycle in U.S. manufacturing industries can provide a clue to understanding the role of
sectorial shocks in the evolution of aggregate employment. First, interindustry wage
di®erentials rise in expansions and fall in contractions. Second, periods of increasing
aggregate employment are associated with relatively good price and productivity
shocks to capital-intensive sectors. The paper presents a simple general-equilibrium
model where bargaining at the industry level and rents due to sector-speci¯c capital
generate a wage structure with higher wages in capital-intensive sectors but where
the response of wages to sector-speci¯c shocks is greater in labor intensive sectors.
Empirical evidence is presented to support such implications of the model. The
asymmetry of wage adjustments imply that aggregate employment responds more
to shocks in capital-intensive industries and that procyclical wage di®erentials can
only result from asymmetric disturbances. (JEL: E24, E32, J23, J31. Key Words:
Cyclical Unemployment, Interindustry Wage Di®erentials, Sector-Speci¯c Wages)
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1 Introduction
This paper stresses a channel of transmission of sectorial shocks and cross-industry real-
location of labor to aggregate employment. It is built on the observation of two related
and relatively unknown empirical regularities about the employment cycle in U.S. man-
ufacturing industries. First, periods of increasing aggregate employment coincide with
relative good price and productivity shocks to capital-intensive sectors while periods of
falling employment are associated with relative good shocks to labor-intensive sectors. A
second feature of the data is related to the cyclical behavior of the interindustry wage
structure. Although quite stable over time1, interindustry wage di®erentials in manufac-
turing sectors widen in expansions and narrow in recessions.
In a context where wages incorporate some sector-speci¯c components and where the
response of wages to industry-speci¯c shocks is greater in labor intensive sectors, an
economy whose business cycle is mainly driven by common disturbances should have an
interindustry wage structure that shrinks in expansions and widens in recessions. For
example, if all sectors face similar positive shocks, it is argued that the greater wage and
employment adjustment in labor intensive sectors should imply a shrinkage in wage di®er-
entials in expansions.2 This paper will o®er evidence to the contrary, focusing speci¯cally
on the cyclical behavior of interindustry wage di®erentials for the U.S. manufacturing sec-
tors over the past 40 years. This implies that either the view that wages respond more in
labor intensive sectors is misleading, or the widely held view that aggregate disturbances
are the main drivers of the business cycle is incomplete.
This paper argues in favor of the second implication by providing evidence that wages
1The stability of the wage structure was ¯rst noticed (up to my knowledge) by Slichter (1950) who
states that "the wage structure changes over time, but the changes are fairly small and the wage structure
between industries within a period of twenty to thirty years exhibits only moderate changes".
2See the arguments and empirical evidence of this view of the business cycle of Bell (1954), Haddy
and Tolles (1957), Watcher (1970), Hall (1975) and Wood and Solon (1990).
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do have sector-speci¯c components, and that the response of wages to shocks is greater in
labor-intensive sectors. In other words, the wage adjustment tends to be in the direction
of employment stabilization. Thus, when output prices, technology or the capital stock
shifts, wages shift in the same direction. In this context, a widening of the interindustry
wage structure results from disturbances that favor capital-intensive sectors. At the
same time, positive shocks to capital-intensive sectors have a much stronger impact on
aggregate employment than positive shocks to labor-intensive sectors both because the
response of sector-speci¯c wages is greater in the latter and because for a country like the
United States, the distribution of employment is biased towards capital-intensive sectors.
These two features explain the positive and signi¯cant association between aggregate
employment dynamics and the capital intensity characteristics of the industries subject
to positive disturbances. The asymmetric response of wages and employment across
sectors implies that impulses with no e®ect in aggregate variables can nonetheless have
substantial impact on aggregate employment.
The notion that wages respond more to sector-speci¯c shocks in labor-intensive sec-
tors can be supported from theories of e±ciency wages, labor hoarding, rent sharing,
bargaining and turnover, among others. Models where the wage structure is a®ected
by the level of sectorial rents have in general higher wages in capital-intensive sectors.
However, the response of rents to industry-speci¯c disturbances may be greater in labor-
intensive industries. The stronger response of wages in labor-intensive sectors does not
imply necessarily that employment variations are smaller in these sectors, for the greater
adjustment in wages is accompanied by a greater shift in labor demand for similar shocks.
I consider a simple general equilibrium model with wage bargaining at the industry level
and sector-speci¯c capital that implies a wage adjustment mechanism as the one just
discussed. I provide empirical evidence for its support.3
3Oi (1962) and Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) present alternative models with similar wage
setting implications. I consider a model of bargaining because it is the simplest that provides a rationale
for the wage-setting structure discussed above and not because I claim empirical validity for the bargaining
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Evidence against the countercyclical behavior of interindustry wage di®erentials that
follows from a view of the business cycle driven by aggregate °uctuations is also presented
in Keane (1993) and McLaughlin and Bils (2001). They argue that although high-wage
¯rms are those with higher employment °uctuations, wage di®erentials fail to widen as
the economy expands.4 They show that after correcting for compositional bias, high
wage industries have the largest increases in composition-corrected wages in cyclical °uc-
tuations. The implicit countercyclical bias of not correcting for compositional e®ects is
based on evidence that in expansions, the average wage of entrants to high-wage sectors
is signi¯cantly smaller than the average wage of incumbent workers. Moreover, the re-
allocation of labor increases the average wage in low-wage industries.5 In Keane words,
after correcting for compositional e®ects, "the results here indicate that no systematic
tendency for industry wage di®erentials to be greater in periods of higher unemployment
exists. In fact, industry wage di®erentials have a slight tendency to narrow in recessions."
Keane (1993) and McLaughlin and Bils (2001) use the evidence against countercycli-
cal interindustry wage di®erentials (and slightly in favor of procyclical wage di®erentials
after correcting for compositional e®ects) to argue against e±ciency wage theories of wage
determination. As mentioned above, in a world where common shocks dominate, e±-
ciency wage theories predict that adverse shocks cause a widening of wage di®erentials
as ¯rms in low-wage industries reduce wages to a greater extent than ¯rms in high-wage
or e±ciency wage paying industries, which try to keep their best employees. This paper
presents evidence on procyclical interindustry wage di®erentials within manufacturing in-
process itself.
4Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) mention also that high wage manufacturing industries are more
cyclically sensitive than lower-wage manufacturing industries.
5Keane, Mo±tt and Runkle (1988) show that within manufacturing industries there exists a counter-
cyclical bias in uncorrected real wages and that manufacturing workers with low permanent wages are
more likely to become unemployed. This evidence, together with the one that high-wage industries tend
to expand relatively more in expansions is consistent with the result that not correcting for compositional
e®ects introduces a countercyclical bias in manufacturing wage di®erentials.
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dustries, and I argue that it provides evidence on the role of sectorial shocks rather than
constituting an argument against e±ciency wages. Indeed, the evidence that wage and
employment responses to similar disturbances are higher in labor-intensive industries is
consistent with e±ciency wage theories.
The paper is also related to the literature that discusses the relative impact of sectorial
and aggregate shocks in employment °uctuations, started with the provocative work of
Lilien (1982). He showed evidence that unusually large sectorial shifts contributed signif-
icantly to the evolution of the unemployment rate in the United States during the 1970s.
While several authors have since provided mixed evidence on the relevance of both types
of disturbances to employment °uctuations, it is fair to say that the mainstream view is
that aggregate shocks are the main drivers of business cycles.6
A fundamental issue when comparing the relevance of common versus sectorial shocks
is the di±culty of distinguishing them. In other words, is it possible to di®erentiate be-
tween di®erent shocks and di®erent responses to a common shock? A common strategy
has been to focus on the implications of both types of disturbances on third variables { e.g.,
sectorial employment distribution, job vacancies, job destruction and creation dynamics.7
This paper will identify the e®ects of sectorial versus common shocks by examining their
opposite implications on the cyclical pattern of interindustry wage di®erentials. If the
dominant force in °uctuations across all sectors are common disturbances, we would ex-
pect wage di®erentials to shrink in expansions and increase in recessions, as periods of
negative shocks imply a greater fall in wages in the low-wage or labor-intensive sector.
6See Abraham and Katz (1986), Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Brainard and Cutler (1993), Ca-
ballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1997) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) for discussions along these
lines.
7For example, Abraham and Katz (1986) and Blanchard and Diamond (1989) consider the evolution
the vacancies to disentangle aggregate from sectorial shocks. Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) consider
that unfavorable aggregate disturbances simultaneously reduce job creation and increase job destruction,
whereas allocative disturbances increase both job creation and destruction.
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Alternatively, procyclical interindustry wage di®erentials can only follow from asymmetric
shocks across sectors, as discussed above. This identi¯cation procedure serves to di®er-
entiate between asymmetric shocks or asymmetric responses to similar shocks. In any
case, I leave for future research the study of the relative importance of common versus
sectorial shocks in the aggregate employment cycle.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 shows the empirical evidence on the cyclical
behavior of the interindustry wage structure, as well as on the association between factor-
intensity distribution of shocks and employment °uctuations. Section 3 presents a simple
model that can account for these stylized facts and section 4 reports the empirical evidence
supporting the wage-setting implications of the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Some Empirical Regularities
One of the main characteristics of the interindustry wage structure is its stability over
time, as Figure 1 shows for 1960 and 1995, where each axis depicts the nominal hourly wage
across 446 4-digit SIC manufacturing industries from the NBER Productivity Database8.
This suggests that the search for its explanation should focus on some structural factors.
A ¯rst line of research is to focus on either unmeasured di®erences in job amenities or
workers' characteristics. Leamer (1999) provides evidence that the economy o®ers a wage-
e®ort contract curve with higher wages in high-e®ort industries.9 Murphy and Topel
(1987) focus on the role of unmeasured abilities of workers. Alternative views stress non-
competitive features of the labor market. Krueger and Summers (1988) present evidence
supporting the e±ciency wage theory of wage determination by arguing that di®erences
in wages are di±cult to link to unobserved di®erences in ability or to compensating
8The correlation coe±cient is 0.77 signi¯cant at 1%. In order to keep the same set of industries across
time, I excluded industries 2794 and 3292 for lack of data in the 1990s. Results do not depend on their
exclusion.
9See also Rosen (1986).
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di®erentials for work conditions, suggesting that workers in high wage industries receive
non-competitive rents. Currie andMcConnell (1992) emphasize a similar point by directly
linking the distribution of wages across sectors to a measure of pro¯ts per employee.
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Figure 1: Stability of Interindustry Wage Structure
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Figure 2: Wage Structure and Factor Intensities
In Leamer's case, and to some extent in explanations related to rent sharing, there
exists a close association between the distribution of wages and the factor-intensity char-
acteristics of industries. In the e®ort explanation of Leamer, it is more costly for capital
to stay idle in capital-intensive sectors; as a result, incentives exist to increment the work-
load through high e®ort. In the case of rent-sharing explanations, it is possible to rewrite
7
pro¯ts per employee in sector i as ri ¢Ki=Li where ri stands for the return to capital in
sector i and Ki=Li is the capital-labor ratio in sector i. For reasonably similar rental
rates across sectors, the cross-industry variation in pro¯ts per employee is dominated by
di®erences in capital/labor ratios. As shown in Figure 2, in 1995 there existed a high and
signi¯cant association between industry wages and capital intensity, and this relationship
is very stable over time.
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Figure 3: Cyclical Behavior Wage Di®erentials 1.
Less well-known is the cyclical behavior of the interindustry wage structure. Although
di®erences in wages across industries seem to be dominated by di®erences in K=L ratios,
that are mainly technologically determined, the reaction of wages to sector-speci¯c dis-
turbances may di®er across sectors. Several mechanisms can support such adjustments,
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depending on the speci¯c model used to explain the wage structure. In this section I estab-
lish the cyclical properties of interindustry wage di®erentials, abstracting from potential
explanations that are discussed in detail in the rest of the paper.
(A) (B ) (C) (D) (A) (B) (C) (D)
Dependent Var d ln ML d ln ML d ln ML d ln ML d ln ML d ln ML d ln ML d ln ML
Explanatory Var
Coefficient 0.185 0.137 0.159 0.129 0.047 0.136 0.102 0.072
St. Deviation (0.072) (0.045) (0.043) (0.037) (0.069) (0.051) (0.047) (0.04)
R-Squared 0.153 0.208 0.271 0.249 0.013 0.161 0.115 0.083
Sample: 1959 - 1996
d ln ML: % change in Manufacturing Employment
Explanatory Variable: Difference between average growth rate of wages in:
(A) 1st Quartile minus 5th Quartile
(B) 2nd Quartile minus 4th Quartile
(C) 2nd to 4th Decile minus 7th to 9th Decile
(D) 2nd to 5th Decile minus 6th to 9th Decile
Industries in decreasing order of K/L ratio.
TABLE 1
CYCLICAL PATTERNS OF WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
A ¯rst look at the cyclical behavior of sectorial wages is depicted in Figure 3, which
plots the percentage change in manufacturing employment for each year between 1959 and
1996 against the di®erence between the average wage change of the 2nd and 4th quintiles
of industries ordered in decreasing order of K=L. Panel (a) considers a measure of weekly
wages while panel (b) measures changes in hourly wages.10 The positive and signi¯cant
correlations (0.46 and 0.40 respectively) suggest that periods of increasing employment
are associated with periods of relative rises in wages in capital-intensive sectors. A
broader view of the data is registered in Table 1, that reports regressions of changes
in manufacturing employment against wage variations for alternative groups. The ¯rst
four columns refer to variations in real weekly wages while the last four columns consider
variations in real hourly wages. Overall, there is a consistent procyclical pattern of wage
di®erentials for alternative cutting points in the wage structure. Similar results (not
reported) follow if we use the evolution of total employment instead of manufacturing
employment as the business cycle measure.11
10Hourly wages were estimated by assuming the same amount of weekly hours to production workers
(available) and to non-production workers (not available).
11Also, the results reported in table 1 are not signi¯ cantly altered if industries are ordered according to
9
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Figure 4: Cyclical Behavior of Wage Di®erentials 2
Figure 4 gives us an alternative look at the interindustry wage structure. It depicts
the cyclical evolution of the dispersion of interindustry wages measured as the variance of
weekly wages across industries. In order to make the variance comparable across years
and to avoid dealing with the trend arising from the natural growth in wages, the measure
uses 1959 as its base year and calculates the variance each year t, discounting the average
rate of growth in wages between t and 1959; that is var(wi;t)=(wt=w59)2 where wt stands
for the average wage rate in year t. In this case, if between year t and t+ 1 all wages
grow at the same rate, the measure shows no growth in the variance of wages. Panel (a)
their average wage level instead of capital intensity. This is of course a consequence of the high correlation
between wage level and capital intensity.
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of Figure 4 depicts variations in total manufacturing employment and percentage change
in the variance of weekly wages. The positive and signi¯cant association reveals that
periods of increasing aggregate manufacturing employment are associated with increases
in the variance of the interindustry wage structure. In other words, industry wage
di®erentials widen in expansions and narrow in recessions.12 The ¯rst three columns in
Table 2 report the results of regressions where the dependent variable is the percentage
change in the variance of interindustry wage structure and the independent variable is
the percentage change in total manufacturing employment between 1959 and 1996. The
collective results reveal that periods of increasing employment are also periods of increases
in the dispersion of the wage structure. The inclusion of a trend variable is aimed to
control for a non-linear e®ect of the trend in the linear relationship between the level
of wage dispersion and aggregate employment. It improves signi¯cantly the ¯tness of
the regression measured using the R-squared and does not alter the relationship between
variations in wage di®erentials and employment °uctuations. Again, the results are not
altered by the use of hourly wages rather than weekly wages (not reported) or with the
use of aggregate employment instead of manufacturing employment as a right hand side
variable (see regressions 4 to 6), suggesting that °uctuations in the wage structure are not
indicative of movements of labor between manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors.
An alternative approach is to estimate the distribution of wage changes across sectors
with di®erent factor intensities. For that, I estimate the correlation coe±cient between
sectorial wage changes and capital intensity. High and positive values in any year reveal
that capital-intensive sectors have relative wage increases. Panel (b) in Figure 4 plots this
correlation coe±cient against changes in manufacturing employment for each year between
1959 and 1996. The positive and signi¯cant association (0.41 at 1%) con¯rms themessage
of regressions 1 to 6 in Table 2: periods of relative wage increases in capital-intensive
sectors are also periods of expansions in aggregate employment, whereas recessions are
12The correlation coe±cient is 0.41 signi¯cant at 1%. Similar results are obtained if hourly wages or
variations in total employment are used.
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periods of relative wage increases in labor-intensive sectors (see columns 7 to 9 in Table
2).13
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Dependent Var WW1 WW1 WW1 W W 1 W W 1 W W 1 W W 2 W W 2 W W 2 DML DTL
Explanatory Var
Constant 0.014 0.000 -0.001 -0.011 -0.021 -0.029 0.053 -0.004 -0.005 0.004 0.022
(0.0074) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.01) (0.011) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.005) (0.003)
DML 0.626 0.571 0.603 1.548 1.477 1.432
(0.231) (0.196) (0.205) (0.579) (0.427) (0.463)
DTL 1.307 1.137 1.383
(0.442) (0.376) (0.39)
TREND1 0.848 0.803 0.929
(0.208) (0.207) (0.164)
TREND2 0.938 0.930 0.934
(0.251) (0.24) (0.194)
C(DP,K/L) 0.079 0.058
(0.043) (0.021)
C(DT,K/L) 0.119 0.063
(0.064) (0.032)
R-squared 0.169 0.434 0.410 0.196 0.442 0.461 0.166 0.569 0.515 0.132 0.203
Adjusted R-squared 0.146 0.399 0.373 0.173 0.408 0.428 0.143 0.542 0.485 0.079 0.155
S.E. of regression 0.045 0.038 0.039 0.045 0.038 0.037 0.113 0.083 0.089 0.031 0.016
DW 1.281 1.851 1.592 1.271 1.899 1.592 1.114 1.873 1.511 1.600 1.317
Sample 1959-96 1959-96 1959-96 1959-96 1959-96 1959-96 1959-96 1959-96 1959-96 1961-96 1961-96
Standard Errors in Parenthesis
Definitions:
WW1: Percentage change in variance on interindustry wages using weekly wages
WW2: Cross-industry correlation of weekly wage variations and K/L ratios.
DML: Percenatge change in total manufacturing employment
DTL: Percentage change in total employment
TREND1: Three-year moving average of dependent variable
TREND2: Four-year moving average of dependent variable
C(DP,K/L): Cross-industry correlation of variations in value-added prices and K/L ratio
C(DT,K/L):  Cross-industry correlation of variations in TFP and K/L ratio
TABLE 2
VARIANCE OF WAGE STRUCTURE
Finally, and just as complementary evidence with respect to the cross-industry distri-
bution of shocks in the business cycle, consider that the response of wages is a®ected by
the short-run response of the return on (immobile) capital in each sector. In an economy
of constant returns to scale and zero pro¯ts, the evolution of capital return is mainly de-
termined by the path of prices, productivity and wages. For any economy-wide pressure
on wages (common for all sectors), it is possible to make a cross-section estimation of
the degree to which the sectorial distribution of price and productivity changes { that
13Again, similar results hold if total employment is used instead of manufacturing employment and if
hourly wage changes are used instead of weekly wages.
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determine the evolution of the return to capital { are related to aggregate employment
°uctuations. For each year between 1961 and 1996, I have calculated the correlation coef-
¯cient between the natural logarithm of the capital/labor ratio and the percentage change
in relative value-added prices14, as well as multi-factor productivity growth for each of
the 446 manufacturing industries15. Columns 10 and 11 in Table 2 report the result of
regressions where the dependent variables are variations in manufacturing and aggregate
employment respectively and the explanatory variables are the correlation coe±cients for
each of the exogenous variables. A high and positive value of the independent variables re-
veal variations in relative prices and multi-factor productivity in favor of capital-intensive
industries. The message is the same in both cases: periods of increasing employment are
associated with relative good price and productivity shocks to capital-intensive sectors,
whereas recessions are periods of relative good price and productivity shocks to labor-
intensive sectors. As long as sector-speci¯c adjustments in wages are related to price
and productivity shocks, these results are consistent with the cyclical behavior of the
interindustry wage structure discussed above.
3 A Simple Model
Consider an economy with i sectors that di®er in their factor intensities. There are two
factors of production: labor and capital. Labor is mobile in across sectors, while capital
is sector-speci¯c. There exists constant return to scale technologies, product markets are
perfectly competitive and output prices are determined in external markets. Although
14Calculated as dpva;i = bpi¡P I µIi cpI1¡P I µIi , where pi is the price of output in sector i, pI is the price of
intermediate input I (materials and energy) and µIi is the share in total costs of input I in sector i.
15I excluded industry-year data points where the rate of change in TFP of value-added prices is higher
than 60% or smaller than -60% in any year. This procedure eliminates 141 industry-year productivity
growth data points and 278 price changes industry-year data points over a total of 16,056 (446*36). The
results are not signi¯cantly a®ected with this elimination, neither qualitatively or quantitatively.
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labor is mobile across sectors, a bargaining process over wages between employees and
employers in each sector implies a wage structure that generates unemployment.
Workers push for wages (wi) considering the outside option available (we), that is the
average wage in the economy corrected by the level of unemployment. Firms push for a
wage level that maximizes pro¯ts. The Nash-bargaining maximand is then
¡i = f (wi=we)¿ i ¢ ¼i(wi) (1)
where f and f¶> 0. The wage bargain must satisfy @ log¡i=@wi = 0. For simplicity,
consider a function f of the type f(wi=we) = ®we=wi with 0 < ® < 1. In this case, the
bargaining process implies the following wage structure16
wi
we
= ki
µKi
µLi
(2)
where ki = ¡¿ i ¢ log ® > 0 and µKi and µLi represent the share in value-added of capital
and labor costs respectively. Equation (2) provides a simple structural explanation for
¯gure 2, considering the close association between measures of factor intensities based
on physical units and cost shares. Regardless of potential di®erences in factor returns,
di®erences in µKi=µLi are dominated by di®erences in Ki=Li. The speci¯city of the
capital stock implies that are exist rents in each industry and, depending on the response
of the return to capital across sectors, the wage premium structure may vary. Indeed,
di®erentiating equation (2) implies that17
bwi = 11 + hicwe + hi1 + hi (bpi + bti) (3)
16The type of function used implies that the relation between wage di®erentials and factor intensity is
linear. In general, many other functions imply positive relationships between wage premiums and factor
intensities (see Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991)).
17Consider µfi = afiwfi=pi where afi represents the amount of factor f required to produce one unit of
good i. Di®erentiating the right hand side of (2) and using the de¯nition of the elasticity of substitution
implies that dµKi¡ cµLi = (¾i¡1)(cwi ¡ bri) = (¾i¡1)µKi (cwi¡ bpi¡ bti): Equation (3) follows directly by reordering
terms.
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where bpi + bti are percentage changes in product prices and multifactor productivity,
and hi = (1¡ ¾i)=µKi. It is not possible a priori not know the sign of hi for it depends
on the size of ¾i. If ¾i < 1 or ¾i > 1 + µKi the response of wages to sector-speci¯c
shocks is greater in labor-intensive sectors, for hi=1 + hi becomes a negative function of
Ki=Li for similar enough elasticities of substitution. However, if 1 < ¾i < 1 + µKi the
wage reaction to sector-speci¯c shocks is negative. The intuition for this result is the
following. A rise in prices or productivity generates an increase in the return to capital at
the initial wage level.18 The change in factor returns will a®ect relative factor intensities
(in physical units) depending on the elasticity of substitution. If ¾i is smaller than one,
the movement towards lower K=L implies a rise in the relative share of capital in value-
added, and hence a rise in the wage premium. The associated wage increase and rental
rate fall generates a new accommodation of K=L that is dominated by the ¯rst e®ect,
causing a ¯nal rise in the share of capital. If ¾i > 1 + µKi, the fall in µKi due to the
increase in L=K at the initial wage level is dominated by the change in relative factor
prices due to changes in relative demands. The wage premium increases. Next section
presents empirical evidence on the size and sectorial distribution of hi based on equation
(3).
Given the wage setting structure, ¯rms take their employment decisions along their
labor demand curves, given by Li = aLiKi=aKi. Totally di®erentiating (for a given stock
of capital) it implies that
bLi = ¾iµKi (bpi + bti ¡ bwi) (4)
Depending on the relative strength of the sector-speci¯c shocks and the wage response
whether employment in each sector rises or falls. Interestingly, the shift in labor demand
to price and productivity changes is greater in labor intensive sectors. Considering the
case where hi > 0, the pressure on sector-speci¯c wages compensates the greater shift in
labor demand. A similar situation occurs in high-wage sectors, where the smaller shift
18 bri = 1µKi ¡ bpi + bti ¡ µLicwi¢.
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in labor demand is accompanied with a smaller pressure on wages. A priori, we cannot
say anything regarding the ¯nal employment e®ect.
The ¯nal step required to make this a general equilibrium model is to establish the
determinants of the outside option available for workers at the moment of the bargain.
Although workers in each sector take the outside option as given, in general equilibrium
we should correspond to an average of wage across sectors corrected by the level of un-
employment. Log di®erentiating the outside option implies that cwe = bw + d(1 ¡ ¹) that
can be proxied as
P
i ¸i bwi+ (1¡¹) ¢Pi ¸i bLi where ¸i is the employment share of sector i
in total employment (
P
i ¸i = 1), ¹ is the unemployment rate and w is the average wage
in the economy. Using (4) and plugging into (3) we get the following expressions for the
percentage change in wages in sector i as a function of all exogenous variables for the
2-sector case
cw1 = (bp1 + bt1) ¢ (1 ¡®)(1¡ ¯¸2) +®Á1(1¡ ¹) + ¯Á2(1 ¡ ¹) ¡ ®¯Á2(1¡ ¹)C
+(bp2+ bt2) ¢ ®¸2 ¡ ®¯¸2 + ®¯Á2(1¡ ¹)C (5)
and
cw2 = (bp2 + bt2) ¢ (1 ¡¯)(1 ¡ ®¸1) +®Á1(1¡ ¹) + ¯Á2(1 ¡ ¹) ¡ ®¯Á1(1¡ ¹)C
+(bp1+ bt1) ¢ ¯¸1 ¡ ®¯¸1 +®¯Á1(1¡ ¹)C (6)
where ® = 1=(1+h1); ¯ = 1=(1+h2); C = 1¡®¸1¡¯¸2+®Á1(1¡¹)+¯Á2(1¡¹) and
Ái = ¸i¾i=µKi. For h1 and h2 > 0; C > 0 Price changes that keep relative prices constant
( bp1 = bp2) have a complete pass-through to nominal wages, and employment does not
change. Only changes in relative prices a®ect real wages. Consistent with the implication
of equation (3), the response of wages in sector 1 to a shock to sector 1 is greater than
the response of wages in sector 2 to a shock to sector 2 if h1(1 ¡ ¸2) ¡ h2(1 ¡ ¸1) >
(Á2 ¡ Á1)(1 ¡ ¹). This inequality holds if h1 > h2 > 0 and unless the production
structure is very biased toward production of capital-intensive goods (very high ¸2) In
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this case, the evolution of wage di®erentials can be written as
cw2 ¡ cw1 = (bp2 + bt2 ¡ bp1 ¡ bt1) ¢ AC (7)
where A = (1¡ ®)(1¡ ¯) +®Á1(1¡ ¹) + ¯Á2(1¡ ¹)¡ ®¯(1¡¹)(Á1+ Á2). Again, if
h1; h2 > 0 then A > 0. In this case, wage di®erences increase if and only if disturbances
favor the capital-intensive sector 2. This is a very important result it suggests that if
wage di®erences consistently increase in expansions and shrink in recessions, there must
be an association between the sectorial distribution of shocks and aggregate employment.
The e®ect of price and technology shocks on aggregate employment has two compo-
nents. First, positive shocks in one sector imply a shift in the labor demand that is
compensated by a rise in wages in that sector. The net e®ect on employment is always
positive as can be seen by plugging equations (5) and (6) into (4). At the same time,
positive shocks in one sector generates rises in wages in the other sector, generating an
unambiguous fall in employment. The aggregate response of employment will depend on
the strength of both forces.
Algebraically, the evolution of aggregate employment is given by cLT = ¸1cL1 + ¸2cL2
that implies
cLT = ( bp2 + bt2 ¡ bp1 ¡ bt1)C ¢ [¯Á2¸1(1 ¡®) ¡ ®Á1¸2(1¡ ¯)] (8)
that can be rewritten as
cLT = (bp2+ bt2 ¡ bp1 ¡ bt1)C ¢ [h1´2 ¡ h2´1] (9)
where ´i is the (absolute value of the) wage elasticity of the labor demand curve in
sector i. A ¯rst implication of equation (9) is that only allocative disturbances rather
than common ones can generate changes in aggregate employment in this model. This is
because common shocks have a complete pass-through to wages, that compensate the shift
in labor demand. Second, the procyclical implications of relative good shocks to capital-
intensive sectors is valid as long as [h1´2 ¡ h2´1]=C > 0. We already saw that as long
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as h1 and h2 > 0, then C > 0. Also, if the response of wages to sector-speci¯c shocks is
greater in labor-intensive sectors (h1 > h2), then this inequality holds as long as di®erences
in h dominate the di®erences in wage elasticities. However, there exists evidence that
the wage elasticities are greater in labor-intensive sectors (´1 > ´2), compensating the
e®ect of di®erences in wage responses. The following section provides evidence that
h1 > h2 > 0. I argue that the positive correlation between shocks to capital-intensive
sectors and aggregate employment reveal that di®erences in the response to sector-speci¯c
shocks dominate di®erences in wage elasticities, although I do not present direct evidence
on this.
4 Sector-Speci¯c Wage Adjustments
The capacity of the model to replicate the cyclical pattern of wage di®erentials and ag-
gregate employment rests on two fundamental elements of the wage determination pro-
cess. First, that wages depend on sector-speci¯c elements and second, that the response
of wages to sector-speci¯c shocks is greater in labor-intensive industries. This section
presents evidence that this is the case.
A ¯rst approach considered is to run panel regressions based on equation 3 under the
assumption that hi is constant over time and varies linearly across sectors with di®erent
factor intensities and that for each industry-year, the evolution of the outside option
or average wages is considered exogenous. Tables 3-1 and 3-2 report result of panel
regressions (both ¯xed and random e®ects) where the dependent variable is the percentage
change in industry¶s i real weekly or hourly wages for 4-digit US SIC manufacturing
sectors between 1961 and 1996 and the dependent variables are percentage change in
relative value-added prices and multifactor productivity and interactions of these variables
with a measure of capital intensity.19 The presence of year dummies and their interactions
with lnKi=Li represent the year variations in the outside option, similar across sectors.
19Each observation is an industry/year pair.
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Overall, there exist signi¯cant evidence that of rent sharing at the sectorial level, and for
a greater response of wages in labor intensive sectors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Explanatory Var
Constant -0.012 0.018 -0.012 -0.061 -0.018 -0.074 -0.012 0.018 -0.012 -0.031 0.018 -0.040
(0.0022) (0.0003) (0.0021) (0.0115) (0.0123) (0.0118) (0.0021) (0.0003) (0.0021) (0.0101) (0.0107) (0.0103)
DP 0.074 0.243 0.177 0.179 0.186 0.072 0.239 0.173 0.174 0.180
(0.0042) (0.018) (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0186) (0.0041) (0.0175) (0.0167) (0.0168) (0.0182)
DP* ln(K/L) -0.038 -0.025 -0.025 -0.027 -0.037 -0.024 -0.025 -0.026
(0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.004) (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0042)
DT 0.191 0.404 0.304 0.321 0.346 0.189 0.389 0.290 0.314 0.342
(0.0073) (0.0292) (0.0279) (0.0286) (0.0304) (0.0071) (0.0286) (0.0273) (0.0281) (0.0298)
DT* ln(K/L) -0.044 -0.029 -0.034 -0.040 -0.041 -0.026 -0.033 -0.040
(0.0076) (0.0072) (0.0074) (0.0079) (0.0074) (0.007) (0.0072) (0.0077)
DP-1 0.030 0.026
(0.0185) (0.0181)
DP-1*ln(K/L) -0.007 -0.006
(0.0043) (0.0042)
DT-1 0.051 0.046
(0.0304) (0.0298)
DT-1*ln(K/L) -0.016 -0.017
(0.0078) (0.0077)
DVADD 0.058 0.049
(0.0077) (0.0073)
DVADD*ln(K/L) -0.008 -0.007
(0.0018) (0.0017)
Year dummies yes no y e s yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes
Year dummies * K/L no no no yes yes yes no no no yes yes yes
R- squared 0.166 0.065 0.168 0.166 0.165 0.131 0.166 0.065 0.168 0.181 0.184 0.149
Within R-squared 0.168 0.067 0.170 1.840 0.187 0.151 0.168 0.067 0.170 0.182 0.185 0.149
N 15737 15737 15737 15737 15073 15737 15737 15737 15737 15737 15073 15737
Standard Errors in Parenthesis
DP: Percentage change in value-added relative prices
DT: Percentage change in TFP
DVADD: Percentage change in real Value Added
ln(K/L): Natural Logarithm of Capital-Labor ratio
Sample: 446 industries, 1961-1996
TABLE 3-1
PANEL REGRESSIONS OF REAL WEEKLY WAGES
Fixed Effects Random Effects
Two elements are worth noticing. First, according to equation (3), these results
reveal that hi=1 + hi is positive and decreasing on lnK=L. However, the sign of hi and
its size is not clear. Assuming that di®erences in the elasticities of substitution across
sectors are not related to factor intensities, cross industry di®erences in hi=1+ hi are only
consistent with positive hi and greater in labor-intensive sectors. Second, considering
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the distribution of K=L across sectors, the coe±cients of the regressions imply that the
e®ect of price and productivity shocks on industry wages is positive, even for very high
capital-intensive sectors.20 This result provides indirect evidence that ¾i is smaller than
one in most industries, and that the pattern of responses is dominated by di®erences in µL.
The only case where this logic may not apply is when the elasticities of substitution are
greater than 1 in most sectors, and increasing with capital intensity. In such scenario, the
results reported in tables 3-1 and 3-2 are consistent with hi smaller than zero. Empirical
studies on elasticity of substitution do not ¯nd that pattern.21 Moreover, although not
reported, the coe±cient of year dummies and its interactions with K=L are negative in
only four cases out of 35, revealing that 1=(1+hi) is positive and smaller than 1 in almost
all industries.
The evidence that hi is positive in most sectors and decreasing the more capital-
intensive a sector is validates the model in its ability to replicate the features of the
business cycle presented in section 2. According to expression (9), if h1 > h2 > 0 increases
in the dispersion of interindustry wages are procyclical if expansions are periods of relative
good shocks to high-wage sectors. This is indeed the evidence presented in the last two
columns of table 2. Furthermore, equation (11) reveals that the response of aggregate
employment is greater if disturbances a®ect capital-intensive sectors if h1 > h2 > 0 and
di®erences in the distribution of employment dominate di®erences in wage elasticity of
labor demand. Although we do not have direct evidence from this, the bias of the
production structure in the United States toward capital-intensive sectors suggests that
this may be perfectly the case. I rather take the results in table 2 as evidence that this is
the case.
20There are very few industries with extreme capital intensity for which the net e®ect of price and
productivity shocks is negative.
21See Hamermesh (1993).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Explanatory Var
Constant 0.002 0.017 0.003 -0.021 -0.017 -0.028 0.002 0.017 0.003 -0.008 0.000 -0.017
(0.0024) (0.0004) (0.0024) (0.0131) (0.0140) (0.0135) (0.0024) (0.0004) (0.0024) (0.0115) (0.0121) (0.0117)
DP 0.074 0.285 0.225 0.222 0.218 0.073 0.280 0.221 0.219 0.212
(0.0048) (0.0202) (0.0194) (0.0196) (0.0210) (0.0046) (0.0196) (0.0188) (0.019) (0.0205)
DP* ln(K/L) -0.050 -0.037 -0.036 -0.035 -0.049 -0.036 -0.036 -0.034
(0.0046) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0049) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0048)
DT 0.197 0.525 0.434 0.430 0.441 0.195 0.509 0.419 0.425 0.440
(0.0082) (0.0328) (0.0316) (0.0325) (0.0344) (0.008) (0.0321) (0.0309) (0.0318) (0.0336)
DT* ln(K/L) -0.083 -0.062 -0.061 -0.064 -0.079 -0.059 -0.061 -0.064
(0.0085) (0.0082) (0.0084) (0.0089) (0.0083) (0.008) (0.0082) (0.0087)
DP-1 0.056 0.052
(0.0209) (0.0204)
DP-1*ln(K/L) -0.013 -0.012
(0.0048) (0.0047)
DT-1 0.068 0.066
(0.0343) (0.0336)
DT-1*ln(K/L) -0.023 -0.023
(0.0089) (0.0087)
DVADD 0.031 0.028
(0.0087) (0.0083)
DVADD*ln(K/L) -0.006 -0.005
(0.002) (0.0019)
Year dummies yes no y e s yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes
Year dummies * K/L no no no yes yes yes no no no yes yes yes
R- squared 0.132 0.049 0.137 0.143 0.147 0.108 0.132 0.049 0.137 0.146 0.150 0.110
Within R-squared 0.133 0.050 0.138 0.147 0.151 0.110 0.133 0.050 0.138 0.147 0.151 0.110
N 15737 15737 15737 15737 15073 15737 15737 15737 15737 15737 15073 15737
Standard Errors in Parenthesis
DP: Percentage change in value-added relative prices
DT: Percentage change in TFP
DVADD: Percentage change in real Value Added
ln(K/L): Natural Logarithm of Capital-Labor ratio
Sample: 446 industries, 1961-1996
TABLE 3-2
PANEL REGRESSIONS OF REAL HOURLY WAGES
Fixed Effects Random Effects
An alternative way of con¯rming this result is to estimate the wage e®ect of price
and productivity shocks in each sector on a time series basis, and compare the respective
coe±cients across factor intensities. Consider the following regression based on expression
(3) for each sector i between 1961 and 1996:
cwit = ¯0 + ¯1cpit + ¯2 btit + ¯3 bwt + "it (10)
where cwit is the rate of growth in real wages (both hourly and weekly), cpit is the rate
of growth of the relative price of industry i to an average of all manufacturing sectors,
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btit is the rate of TFP growth and bwt is the percentage change in observed average real
wages (both hourly and weekly) used as a proxy for the percentage change in the outside
option. Table 4 reports the coe±cients and standard errors of cross-industry regressions,
where the dependent variables are ¯1 and ¯2 and the explanatory variable is lnK=L for
1990.22 The negative and highly signi¯cant coe±cients con¯rm the results from the panel
regressions: the response of wages to sector-speci¯c shocks is smaller in capital-intensive
sectors. Moreover, given the distribution of K=L across sectors, Table 4 reveals that for
almost all sectors the coe±cients ¯1 and ¯2 are positive.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Var b1 b2 b1 b2
Explanatory Var
Constant 0.262 0.307 0.316 0.468
(0.041) (0.05) (0.048) (0.059)
K/L -0.041 -0.031 -0.052 -0.069
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
R-squared 0.037 0.014 0.042 0.048
Adjusted R-squared 0.034 0.012 0.040 0.045
S.E. of regression 0.185 0.227 0.220 0.273
Standard Errors in Parenthesis
Definitions:
Reg. (1) and (2) are derived from analysis with weekly real wages
Reg. (3) and (4) are derived from analysis with hourly real wages
b1: Coefficient on relative prices in regression (13)
b2: Coefficient on productivity growth in regression (13)
K/L: Capital-Labor ratio in 1990
Sample: 445 industries (excluded 2793, 2794 and 3292)
TABLE 4
CROSS-INDUSTRY COMPARISONS
With respect to the evolution of employment at the sectorial level during the em-
ployment cycle, while there exist a high co-movement of employment across sectors, high
wage manufacturing industries tend are more cyclically sensitive than lower-wage man-
ufactures. In other words, high-wage industries tend to expand relatively more in ex-
pansions.23 According to the model presented above, although the expansion of labor
demand to sector-speci¯c shocks is greater in labor-intensive sectors, this e®ect is com-
22Results are not a®ected by the speci¯ c year used to measure K=L. The results are not a®ected if the
measure of average wage change is excluded from the regressions.
23See Keane, Mo±t and Runkle (1988), Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995), Davis, Haltiwanger and
Schuh (1996) and Hall (1998).
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pensated by a greater reaction of wages. It is not clear whether conditional on shocks,
the expansion to capital-intensive sectors di®ers from that of labor-intensive sectors.
Tables 5-1 and 5-2 present the results of panel regressions where the dependent vari-
ables are the percentage change in total employment and in total hours against variations
in relative prices, multifactor productivity and interaction terms with measures of factor
intensity. I have also included year dummies and their interactions with K=L. The
results reveal that the greater adjustment of wages do not dominate the greater shift
in labor demand in labor-intensive sectors, making employment, hours and wages more
volatile in these industries than in capital intensive sectors. These results do not vary
if measures of wage changes are also included. Do these results contradict the evidence
of greater response of employment in capital-intensive sectors in the business cycle? No,
because the regressions in table 5 correct for sector-speci¯c shocks. In other words, they
are conditional on the observed shocks. A greater response of employment in high-wage
sectors during the business cycle (see footnote 22) is consistent with these results if expan-
sions are periods of relative good shocks to capital-intensive industries. This is exactly
the message of the paper.
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Dependent Var (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Explanatory Var
Constant 0.007 0.001 0.008 -0.013 0.007 0.039 0.011 -0.024
(0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0039)
DP 0.418 0.523 0.505 0.416 0.519 0.501
(0.0351) (0.0341) (0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0337) (0.0343)
DP*ln(K/L) -0.057 -0.072 -0.071 -0.056 -0.071 -0.070
(0.0081) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.008) (0.0078) (0.0079)
DT 1.159 1.340 1.328 1.173 1.436 1.336
(0.0571) (0.0564) (0.0572) (0.0567) (0.0561) (0.0569)
DT*ln(K/L) -0.158 -0.176 -0.183 -0.161 -0.178 -0.185
(0.0148) (0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0145) (0.0147)
DWW -0.603 -0.590
(0.0588) (0.0573)
DWW*ln(K/L) 0.005 0.002
(0.0157) (0.0153)
DHW -0.405 -0.391
(0.0532) (0.0521)
DHW*ln(K/L) 0.008 0.004
(0.0143) (0.0139)
DVADD 0.737 0.750
(0.0133) (0.0129)
DVADD*ln(K/L) -0.120 -0.124
(0.0032) (0.0031)
Year Dummies y e s y e s yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-Squared 0.188 0.251 0.221 0.362 0.288 0.251 0.222 0.362
Within 0.194 0.260 0.230 0.360 0.194 0.260 0.230 0.360
N 15750 15737 15737 15750 15750 15737 15737 15750
Standard Errors in Parenthesis
DP: Percentage change in value-added relative prices
DT: Percentage change in TFP
DWW: Percentage change in real weekly wages
DHW: Percentage change in real hourly wages
DVADD: Percentage change in real Value Added
ln(K/L): Natural Logarithm of Capital-Labor ratio
Sample: 446 industries, 1961-1996
Fixed Effects Random Effects
TABLE 5-1
PANEL REGRESSIONS ON TOTAL EMPLOYMENT
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Dependent Var (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Explanatory Var
Constant -0.005 -0.009 -0.003 -0.026 -0.005 0.040 0.024 -0.025
(0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0042)
DP 0.372 0.439 0.547 0.371 0.436 0.544
(0.0373) (0.0734) (0.0345) (0.0369) (0.0369) (0.0342)
DP*ln(K/L) -0.045 -0.056 -0.074 -0.045 -0.055 -0.073
(0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0079) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0079)
DT 1.038 1.162 1.378 1.054 1.170 1.383
(-0.0608) (0.0618) (0.057) (0.0603) (0.0616) (0.0568)
DT*ln(K/L) -0.013 -0.142 -0.176 -0.013 -0.144 -0.178
(0.0066) (0.0159) (0.0147) (0.0066) (0.0159) (0.0146)
DWW -0.435 -0.409
(0.0645) (0.0625)
DWW*ln(K/L) 0.027 0.020
(0.0173) (0.0166)
DHW -0.797 -0.789
(0.053) (0.0519)
DHW*ln(K/L) 0.007 0.006
(0.0142) (0.0139)
DVADD 0.756 0.768
(0.0141) (0.0137)
DVADD*ln(K/L) -0.121 -0.124
(0.0034) (0.0033)
Year Dummies y e s y e s yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-Squared 0.187 0.206 0.311 0.365 0.187 0.206 0.311 0.365
Within 0.193 0.213 0.323 0.363 0.193 0.213 0.323 0.363
N 15750 15737 15737 15750 15750 15737 15737 15750
Standard Errors in Parenthesis
DP: Percentage change in value-added relative prices
DT: Percentage change in TFP
DWW: Percentage change in real weekly wages
DHW: Percentage change in real hourly wages
DVADD: Percentage change in real Value Added
ln(K/L): Natural Logarithm of Capital-Labor ratio
Sample: 446 industries, 1961-1996
Fixed Effects Random Effects
TABLE 5-2
PANEL REGRESSIONS ON TOTAL HOURS
5 Conclusion
The paper shows that although the response of wages and employment to sector-speci¯c
shocks is greater in labor intensive sectors, interindustry wage di®erentials widen in ex-
pansions and narrow in recessions. This is contrary to the behavior that we would expect
if common shocks were the main drivers of the business cycle. The paper o®ers an expla-
nation for both stylized facts, based on the relevance of sectorial shocks. The asymmetric
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response of wages in labor-intensive and capital-intensive sectors to disturbances implies
that the former have a higher tendency to smooth their employment path.
Two further extensions of this paper are wise. First, it is possible to estimate what
part of the business cycle that is due to aggregate and sectorial shocks. Up to know,
the literature has given most of the weight to aggregate shocks. This paper highlights
that procyclical interindustry wage di®erentials suggest that the sectorial distribution of
shocks in relevant for the employment cycle, but no e®ort is done in order to quantify
its impact. Second, the asymmetric adjustment in wages across sectors suggests a new
path to discuss the costs of business cycles. Part of the literature emphasizing the small
costs of the business cycle is based on the smooth evolution of wages along the cycle.
However, the results presented here suggest that there is much more variation in wages
along the cycle, and hence in the presence of incomplete markets the costs of employment
°uctuations may be much higher.24
24This point was suggested to me by Carmen Pages-Serra.
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